The supermarket fridge attacks: what if the controllers had been on VeilNet?
Attackers warmed up supermarket fridges across Europe through controllers that anyone on the internet could reach. The makers and Europe's cyber agencies now agree on the fix: take them off the internet. So what if those controllers had been connected through VeilNet? Here's what the attackers would have found, and why it would have been simpler to roll out than a VPN at every store.
On the night of 11 October 2026, someone reached the controllers that run the refrigeration in hundreds of French supermarkets and switched them to defrost. By morning, some cases had reached 50 °C. Three weeks later, on 2 November, it happened again, this time in stores across much of Europe.
The attacks didn't need anything clever. They needed controllers that anyone on the internet could reach. This post looks at how that happened and what the makers and Europe's cyber agencies now advise. Then it asks a hypothetical question: what if those controllers had been connected through VeilNet, and how hard would that have been to roll out?
What happened
- October, France. France's finance minister put the number of stores hit at about 700. Les Mousquetaires, which owns Intermarché and Netto, said about 180 of its own were affected. Food was thrown away, some equipment overheated, and that group alone expected losses of several million euros.
- November, across Europe. On 2 November, stores in Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden were hit, from big chains to corner shops. At one store in Stockholm, staff said every freezer had reached 50 °C.
- Who did it. No one has claimed the attacks, and who was behind them is still disputed.
How they got in
The controllers in question are the small computers that run a store's refrigeration. They hold the temperature of every case, schedule defrost cycles and raise alarms. France's national alert team, CERT-FR, named the products involved: Danfoss's AK-SM and AK-SC series, and the XWEB controllers sold by Copeland and Dixell. Danfoss said its AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 were among the units affected.
What they had in common wasn't a maker. It was exposure. Each controller has a web page for managing it, and at these stores that page could be reached from the public internet. The head of France's cyber agency, ANSSI, told the French Senate it came down to basic security failings: equipment connected directly to the internet, protected by weak passwords. In the Netherlands, Danfoss said the systems hit still used their default passwords, and it said most of the units hit in France were older models that no longer receive updates.
Finding them is easy. Services such as Shodan and Censys scan the whole internet around the clock and list whatever answers, controllers included. In August, researchers at Claroty reported a Censys scan that found more than 2,700 of one Danfoss model online. In November, researchers at Midnight Blue still found hundreds of Danfoss systems, though they warned that many were by then decoys set up to catch attackers, along with more than a thousand controllers from Copeland and Dixell.
The controllers' web pages could be reached from the internet: through a port forward on the store's router, a public address on a cellular SIM, or similar. A default or weak password did the rest.
Passwords aren't the only worry, either. A way to skip the login on one model was found and fixed in 2025, but a fix only helps the units that get it. In November, Midnight Blue reported six more flaws in the AK-SM 800A that let an attacker take over a unit without logging in at all. Nothing shows they were used in these attacks, but when Ireland's NCSC warned about them on 13 November, no fix was available.
Why they were online at all
It's tempting to ask why anyone would put a fridge on the internet. The answer is that someone has to look after it. Refrigeration is usually run by a contractor rather than the store's own IT team, and the contractor watches the cases, answers alarms and fixes faults from afar. Insurance can depend on it, too: CERT-FR advises stores to check their insurance contract before cutting the data feed to their refrigeration contractor.
So unplugging isn't the answer. The controllers need to stay reachable, just not by everyone.
What the makers and agencies advise
Since the attacks, the makers and the agencies have given strikingly consistent advice:
- Danfoss. Its guide for the AK-SM 800A says the unit “should not be directly reachable from the public internet”, and that this “applies to all software versions, including those with Strict Mode enabled”. It asks for remote access through a VPN only, and for the controllers to sit on a network segment of their own, apart from the office, guest and till networks.
- CERT-FR. Remove the units' exposure to the internet, and restore access only through a secure VPN or a protected network.
- Ireland's NCSC. Removing direct internet exposure is the “only real solution”. Firmware updates, new passwords and Strict Mode aren't enough on their own for a controller that stays exposed.
- Germany's BSI. Controllers like these shouldn't be reachable from the internet, only from trusted networks or through a VPN.
All of it is good advice. Change default passwords, and update what can be updated. But the step everyone agrees on comes first: take the controllers off the internet, without cutting off the people who look after them.
The usual way to do that is a VPN. It works, but somewhere a VPN gateway has to face the internet, at each store or at head office, and VPN gateways are among the most attacked devices there are. We wrote about why in Silent to strangers.
What if the stores had used VeilNet?
VeilNet joins machines into a private network, with every connection between them encrypted end to end using post-quantum cryptography. So imagine the same store, with its controllers connected through VeilNet. A refrigeration controller can't run VeilNet's agent, and it wouldn't need to. Instead, a small machine in the store, which we'll call the VeilNet box, would run the agent and share the store's refrigeration network with the rest of the VeilNet network. That role is called a subnet router.
- The controllers would stay as they are.They'd install nothing, and keep their settings and firmware.
- The way in from the internet would be gone. The port forward on the store's router, or the public address on its SIM, would be removed. The VeilNet box connects out, so nothing would need forwarding to it either. By default it asks the store's router to open a port for it over UPnP, so UPnP would be off on that router, as Danfoss advises anyway.
- The people who need access would keep it. The contractor's technicians and monitoring centre would join the same VeilNet network, and reach each controller at its address on the store's network, from wherever they are.
Had the store used VeilNet, its router would forward nothing to the controller. A small VeilNet box would share the refrigeration network, the controller would be left as it was, and only members of the network, such as the contractor's technicians and monitoring centre, could reach it.
That matches what Danfoss and the agencies ask for: the controller off the internet, with remote access only through a protected network. Keeping the controllers on a segment of their own would still be a job for the store's network, with the box on that segment. The difference is that there'd be no VPN gateway out on the internet, waiting for visitors.
A chain with a fleet of stores would run its own root with VeilNet's guardian, so that only machines it adds can join at all. The boxes, the technicians' laptops and the monitoring server would sit in a refrigeration compartment, with each store's network bound to that compartment. VeilNet also hosts a free network you can try this on, where a shared name called a taint works like the network's password: fine for a trial, but anyone who has it can join.
What the attackers would have faced
In that store, on the chain's own root, the attacks described above would have run into this:
- Nothing to find. The controller's page wouldn't have been on the internet, and nothing at the store would have been opened to it. Even a machine that reached the VeilNet box would have got no reply unless the network admitted it: no login page, no banner, nothing that says what's behind it.
- A password wouldn't have been enough. A default or weak password is no use to someone who can't reach the login page. To get that far, an attacker would first have needed a machine the network admits, in the right compartment.
- Unfixed flaws would have been out of reach. Flaws like the six found in November only work if the attacker can reach the controller first. From the internet, they couldn't have.
- Access would be per compartment. The chain would set each machine's compartments when adding it, and only its admins could change them, so a machine couldn't put itself in the refrigeration compartment. With the store's network bound to that compartment, a till on the same VeilNet network would be dropped at the box.
- Access could be taken away, and it would be on record. If a laptop went missing or a contractor changed, blocking the machine would shut it out within minutes. With traffic observation on, as it is by default, the guardian would keep 90 days of records of the traffic to each controller: which machine, which controller, and when.
Strangers, and anyone holding only a password, get no reply at all. With the refrigeration network bound to its compartment, a member in another compartment is dropped at the box. Only machines in the refrigeration compartment reach the controllers.
Simpler to roll out, too
For the people who look after the fridges, very little would change. Technicians would open the same pages, with the same tools. Nothing about the controllers, their firmware or the store's layout would need redesigning.
Getting there would be simpler too. Taking hundreds of stores off the internet the usual way is a project in itself: every store needs a VPN device or a tunnel to head office, each with its own keys, routes and firewall rules, set up, tested and kept patched one site at a time. On VeilNet, the work would be much smaller:
- Nothing to install on the controllers. They'd keep their settings and firmware, and the refrigeration would keep running while the box goes in beside it.
- One file and three commands per store. Each store's box would be added in the guardian console, which hands over one file for it. On the box, that's three commands: install VeilNet, join with the file, and share the refrigeration network. There are no tunnels, keys or routes to write by hand.
- Nothing to open at the store. The box connects out over the store's ordinary internet connection, so there'd be no port forwards, inbound firewall rules or public addresses to arrange, store by store.
- One network for every store. Technicians wouldn't juggle a tunnel or a profile per store. With VeilNet on their laptops, they'd reach every store they're allowed into, each controller at its own address.
- Access managed in one place. Adding a technician's laptop, moving a machine to another compartment or shutting out a lost one would be done once, in the guardian console, not store by store.
- A spare without extra setup. A second box on the same network, set up the same way, would share the work and take over within seconds if the first failed, though a technician's open session might need to reconnect. We described how in our post on load balancing.
The one thing to plan would be addressing. Each store's refrigeration network would need an address range of its own, such as 10.17.50.0/24 for store 17, so that an address means one controller in one store. Where every store uses the same range, each would need its own first.
Not just fridges
Ireland's NCSC warned that other refrigeration controllers and industrial monitoring devices with management pages on the internet “may face similar risks”, and the pattern runs well beyond refrigeration: building management, cameras, door controllers, factory equipment and EV chargers, each with a web page someone opened to the internet so a contractor could reach it. The answer is the same each time. Take the device off the internet, and let the people who need it in through a network that ignores everyone else.
Side by side
| On the internet | Behind a VPN | On VeilNet | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who can find the controller | Anyone running a scan | Only VPN users, but a VPN gateway faces the internet | Only machines your network admits. Scanners get no reply |
| Who can try to log in | Anyone | Anyone with VPN access | Only machines in the refrigeration compartment |
| An unfixed flaw in the controller | Open to the whole internet | Open to VPN users | Open only to the refrigeration compartment |
| Work at each store | A port forward | A VPN device or a tunnel, with its own keys, routes and firewall rules | A small machine, one file from the guardian and three commands. Nothing to open |
| Changing who has access | Passwords on every controller | VPN accounts and firewall rules | Once, in the guardian console |
| Encryption | Whatever the controller's page offers | Depends on the VPN, often classical | Post-quantum to the VeilNet box. The last hop inside the store isn't |
Try it
You can try this on the free network VeilNet hosts, with one machine on a device network and one laptop. The Edge and IoT guide walks through sharing a site's devices with a subnet router, and compartments explains how to offer a network to some machines and not others.
If you look after refrigeration, or any equipment like it, across many sites, we'd be glad to help you plan it. Book a demo or write to sovereign@veilnet.net.